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The False Panacea of International Agreements for 
U.S. Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
David A. Hall* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) pose a unique threat to the 
United States. Unlike other investment vehicles used solely to 
maximize returns, SWFs may invest for political objectives or 
strategic resource procurement, both of which are potentially 
harmful to U.S. interests. Countries such as China, Russia, and Saudi 
Arabia all have SWFs currently in operation in the United States, and 
the number of countries following this trend continues to rise.1 
Despite the economic and national security risks that SWFs pose 
to the United States, political institutions have largely ignored these 
investment vehicles, allowing them to move freely within the 
financial sector. Ironically, in 2006, politicians blocked the purchase 
of a U.S. port management company by a foreign state-owned 
company.2 Such action seems inconsistent considering the arguably 
more sensitive nature of the U.S. financial sector; after all, if the 
government is concerned about the security of our ports, why not be 
equally concerned with the security of our economy?3 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman, 
Christopher Cox, stated that the rise of SWFs poses a challenge to 
regulators, implying a need to regulate SWFs.4 Solving this regulatory 
 
* J.D. candidate, Washington College of Law, American University (2009). The author 
thanks his advisor, Professor V. Gerard Comizio. 
 1. See Appendix A. 
 2. The failed takeover of a U.S. company by a foreign state-owned company illustrates 
the heterogeneous views of foreign governments investing in U.S. assets. See EDWARD M. 
GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 136–43 (2006) (describing the politicization of the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States’ (CFIUS) review of the proposed title transfer of Peninsular 
and Oriental Steam Navigation Company to Dubai Ports World, which is owned by the 
United Arab Emirates). 
 3. See Robin Sidel, Abu Dhabi to Bolster Citigroup with $7.5 Billion Capital Infusion, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2007, at A3 (explaining that the Abu Dhabi investment authority does 
not have special ownership rights or a role in the management of Citigroup). 
 4. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Keynote Address and Robert R. Glauber 
Lecture at the John F. Kennedy School of Government: The Role of Government in Markets 
(Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407cc.htm 
(questioning the role of government investment funds in a public market as contrary to the 
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challenge is difficult, even with the existing international agreements 
signed or implemented by the United States because SWFs are 
investors and U.S. regulators generally do not regulate investors.5 
Despite the increase in SWFs, many questions on how to regulate 
them remain unanswered by the extant literature. In particular, 
current works have failed to consider the legal issues surrounding 
regulation through international agreements, and the necessary 
modifications to increase the effectiveness of such agreements. This 
Comment argues that the legal and regulatory framework under 
currently applicable international agreements fails to effectively 
regulate SWFs and offers recommendations to modify and enhance 
the existing framework. 
Part II defines SWFs, discusses the current state of SWF 
regulation by the United States, and introduces the defenses 
available and applicable jurisdictional bars to SWFs in the U.S. 
judicial system. Additionally, it examines the various international 
agreements that potentially affect U.S. regulation of SWFs and 
several of the risks posed by SWFs. 
Part III demonstrates the infeasibility of sovereign action 
jurisdictional bars in U.S. courts. This Part then determines that the 
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions Multilateral Memorandum 
of Understanding (IOSCO MOU) will not allow the SEC to 
effectively force disclosures from SWFs. Part III also examines the 
potential for indirect regulation of SWFs through financial 
intermediaries under the Basel II Accord and ultimately concludes 
that it offers minimal relief. Finally, Part III finds the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement’s role in regulating 
SWFs negligible at best.6 
In Part IV, this Comment offers recommendations for the U.S. 
Model Investment Treaty, the capital adequacy requirements of the 
Basel II Accord, and specific changes for the IMF Articles of 
 
regulatory philosophy of the United States). 
 5. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing the regulatory approach to SWFs and the 
exceptions to a lack of regulation of investor behavior). 
 6. See discussion infra Part III.C (arguing that the IMF Articles of Agreement do not 
provide an effective means of forcing disclosures from SWFs because they are focused on 
exchange rates and utilizing the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as the principal asset for reserve 
holdings); cf. DENNIS R. APPLEYARD ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 725 (5th ed. 
2006) (revealing that some refer to the SDR as “paper gold” because the IMF created the 
reserve assets “out of thin air”). The IMF utilizes a basket of currencies to determine the value 
of the SDR. Id. 
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Agreement. Ultimately, international agreements provide inadequate 
support for potential U.S. regulation of SWFs. 
II. LEGAL AND REGULATORY CONTEXT 
SWFs raise fundamental questions about whether the United 
States is willing to regulate investor activity and how such regulation 
would be carried out under international agreements.7 Moreover, 
they pose unique challenges to U.S. financial regulators who depend 
on foreign regulators for information about foreign violators of U.S. 
securities laws.8 Even after regulators have sufficient information to 
bring a claim against a noncompliant SWF, they must still overcome 
jurisdictional bars SWFs may raise to quash regulatory proceedings in 
a U.S. court.9 
Any discussion of SWFs must be framed within the legal and 
regulatory context in which they operate. That context includes the 
following international agreements signed by the United States: 
numerous bilateral agreements to promote and protect investment,10 
a multilateral information sharing agreement to better prosecute 
trans-border securities law violators,11 and agreements to protect the 
stability of the international financial system.12 
By way of background, this Part briefly introduces SWFs and 
 
 7. See 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 3, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT] 
(providing for national treatment of foreign investors, which potentially implicates a regulatory 
scheme that singles out SWFs). 
 8. See generally Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns [IOSCO], Multilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information 
(May 2002), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf 
[hereinafter IOSCO MOU] (revealing the need for international cooperation for the 
enforcement of securities laws). 
 9. See Philip J. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and its 
Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2727–41 (1996) (offering 
the application of jurisdictional bars in the sovereign debt context, which an SWF could 
utilize). 
 10. See Appendix C. 
 11. See IOSCO MOU, supra note 8. 
 12. Federal Reserve Board, Joint Final Rule and Supporting Board Documents: Risk-
Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework—Basel II, 7 (Nov. 2, 2007), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/GeneralInfo/basel2/FinalRule_BaselII/ 
FinalRule_Draft.pdf. [hereinafter U.S. Final Rule] (implementing the Advanced Capital 
Adequacy Framework in the United States); Second Amendment of Articles of Agreement of 
the International Monetary Fund, art. VIII, Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No 
8937, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa.pdf [hereinafter IMF 
Articles]. 
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discusses the risks they pose to the U.S. financial system, the current 
U.S. regulatory approach, and the sovereign immunity of SWFs and 
potential jurisdictional bars to claims against SWFs. This Part also 
examines international agreements that protect investors and the 
global financial network. 
A. Risks Posed by Sovereign Wealth Funds to the U.S. Financial System 
An SWF may present risks to the U.S. financial system in four 
main areas: (1) direct investment in U.S. publicly traded companies, 
(2) investment through alternative investment vehicles such as hedge 
funds and private equity groups, (3) the use of financial 
intermediaries to utilize modern finance techniques, and (4) the 
issuance of securities through a corporation it controls.13 While not 
necessarily discrete categories,14 they serve as a useful framework for 
understanding the challenges facing U.S. regulators. Keeping these 
fluid risk categories in mind, the opacity of SWFs leads to concerns 
about the motivation and purpose of their investments. Politicians 
and investors alike may question whether an SWF is investing for 
“economic returns, political objectives, [or] securing strategic 
resources.”15 As evidenced by the failed deal between the China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Unocal,16 
political considerations play into the concerns of regulators and the 
politicians who appoint them.17 
Calls by SEC Chairman Cox for the regulation of SWFs 
demonstrate political concern over the current securities regulations, 
 
 13. For specific examples of SWFs from many different countries operating in these areas 
of the U.S. financial system, see generally MARTIN A. WEISS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 
(2008). 
 14. For instance, a Chinese SWF’s purchase of a less than ten percent stake in 
Blackstone, a U.S. private equity firm, demonstrates the fluidity of the categories because it 
represents the direct purchase of a U.S. company that also serves as an alternative investment 
manager. See Blackstone Group, L.P., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 4 (June 11, 
2007). 
 15. See The World’s Most Expensive Club, ECONOMIST, May 26, 2007, at 79 (arguing 
that the Chinese purchase of a stake in Blackstone could be understood as a political maneuver 
in response to growing protectionist sentiment). 
 16. See GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 2, at 128–36 (contending that the attempt 
of CNOOC to purchase the U.S. oil company Unocal and the subsequent prevention by the 
United States Congress utilizing the CFIUS process was motivated by a political “perfect 
storm,” which included nearly record high oil prices, strong anti-Chinese sentiment, and 
Chevron’s attempt to purchase the company). 
 17. See The World’s Most Expensive Club, supra note 15. 
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which present little challenge to the operation of SWFs in the United 
States.18 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) requires 
an SWF to provide notice if it acquires beneficial ownership of more 
than five percent of a U.S. regulated company.19 This requirement 
leads to information disclosure, but not necessarily to regulation of 
the SWF.20 SWFs face additional reporting requirements and activity 
restrictions if they acquire more than ten percent of a U.S. regulated 
company.21 
Restrictions on SWFs that may benefit owners of U.S. regulated 
companies involve the purchase and sale of shares, but these 
provisions do not solve the problem of enforcing regulation across 
borders.22 Additionally, SWFs could leverage their position as 
insiders in their home countries to purchase securities before they are 
offered to the general public, and then resell them to U.S. investors 
through a financial intermediary or on the over-the-counter (OTC) 
market.23 Finally, SWFs may expose themselves to liability by selling 
unregistered securities to U.S. investors through companies they 
control.24 These regulatory provisions lack teeth because of the 
inability to enforce them. 
 
 18. See WEISS, supra note 13, at 8 (noting Blackstone CEO Steve Schwarzman’s 
statement concerning the Chinese SWF purchase of a less than ten percent stake in that 
company as not needing government approval). 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d). 
 20. Id. (requiring the disclosure of information by those owning more than five percent 
of a U.S. regulated company). See also Simon Johnson, The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
44:3 FIN. & DEV. (International Monetary Fund Sept. 2007) available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/index.htm. 
 21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m–n. 
 22. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78n (creating a U.S. restriction on beneficial owner activities, 
but not providing a cross-border mechanism to enforce it), with IOSCO MOU, supra note 8, 
§ 6 (acknowledging the ineffectiveness of cross-border enforcement without foreign regulator 
cooperation). 
 23. See 17 C.F.R. §230.501–506 (2008) (stipulating restrictions for the resale of 
restricted securities to unaccredited investors). It is also possible that foreign issuers besides 
SWFs could take advantage of insider trading due to lax foreign regulation. 
 24. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (prohibiting the sale or delivery of unregistered securities 
through the means of interstate commerce); see also WEISS, supra note 13, at 8 (detailing the 
investments of the Chinese SWF, including its purchase of an investment company from a 
Chinese bank, demonstrating how SWFs could potentially purchase entire companies should it 
suit their investment objectives). 
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B. Introduction to Sovereign Wealth Funds -- Old Players with New 
Names and Modern Techniques 
SWFs control large amounts of capital invested in the United 
States and are reluctant to disclose investment information.25 SWFs 
with different mandates and motivations for investing pose risks 
different from those posed by other market participants, including 
hedge funds and institutional investors.26 The subsections below 
offer a general overview of the purposes of SWFs and their operation 
in the financial system. 
1. General overview of sovereign wealth funds 
SWFs are not a new phenomenon,27 but they have recently 
garnered more attention.28 They are government-owned investment 
vehicles that invest in a country’s reserve assets.29 More specifically, 
 
 25. Cf. Stuart E. Eizenstat & Alan Larson, The Sovereign Wealth Fund Explosion, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 1, 2007, at A19 (arguing that SWFs should disclose financial results and make 
clear that maximizing financial return drives investment decisions). 
 26. See id. (noting that pension funds, one kind of institutional investor,  invest on 
behalf of pensioners while SWFs may invest to control strategic resources or bolster national 
companies). 
 27. SWFs have been around since at least the middle of the 20th century; there is 
disagreement, however, as to the precise moment of origination. Compare Philipp M. 
Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman, Swiss Nat’l Bank, Speech at the Int’l Ctr. For Monetary and 
Banking Studies: The Challenge of Sovereign Wealth Funds (Dec. 18, 2007) (positing that the 
first SWF began in 1816 when the government of France set up Caisse des Dépots), with The 
World’s Most Expensive Club, supra note 15 (stating that SWFs probably began inadvertently in 
1956 with the Gilbert Islands and the British administration of Micronesia). 
 28. See Johnson, supra note 20. Johnson puts this figure in the context of U.S. GDP, 
which is $12 trillion per year, and the total value of traded securities, which is approximately 
$50 trillion. Compare id. (arriving at a $10 trillion estimate for assets controlled by SWFs in 
2012), with Cox, supra note 4 (proposing SWFs could control $12 trillion by 2015); see also 
Johnson, supra note 20 (arguing the divergence in figures is not surprising as there is a “dearth 
of information” with respect to SWFs); see generally Bob Davis, How Trade Talks Could Tame 
Sovereign-Wealth Funds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2007, at A2 (analyzing the possibility of making 
SWF regulation a new topic for global trade talks); see generally Eizenstat & Larson, supra note 
25 (discussing political concerns over SWFs which stem from the increasing amounts under the 
control of SWFs and the politically sensitive locations of some of the new SWFs being set up). 
 29. Cf. APPLEYARD ET AL., supra note 6, at 736 (noting the falling overall value of 
reserves relative to imports in the international financial system, but explaining that excess 
reserves result from exchange rate intervention). Reserves are a country’s foreign exchange 
assets that accrue due to a trade surplus or undervalued exchange rate. Id. A country like China 
has a trade surplus with the United States, which means it exports more goods to the United 
States than it imports. Id. The revenue from exports brings more money into the country than 
leaves the country in terms of spending on imports. Id. In this example, if this trade imbalance 
persists, then the net exporting country builds up surplus dollars. Id. The Chinese state builds 
up these assets because it exchanges Chinese yuan with citizens who receive dollars in exchange 
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SWFs invest excess reserves30 in assets denominated in another 
country’s currency.31 In theory, the goal of SWFs is the long-term 
investment of excess reserves, while maximizing investment returns.32 
SWFs differ from institutional investors like pension funds in that 
they generally have no explicit liabilities.33 A pension fund’s liabilities 
are the payments it must eventually make to its investors, at a greater 
sum than that originally received.34 
An SWF is an entity separate35 from a country’s central bank.36 
 
for the goods they exported. Id. 
 30. See Em Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 468 (2nd Cir. 2007) 
(describing an Argentine decree concerning excess reserves in a sovereign debt dispute). Excess 
reserves can also be understood as the amount of reserves in excess of what a country needs to 
cover its monetary base. Id. See also Johnson, supra note 20 (stating that “extra” reserves are 
those in excess of what a country feels are necessary for “immediate purposes”); A 
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING 140 (John Smullen & Nicholas Hand eds., 3d. ed. 
Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (declaring that excess reserves are undesirable and result from poor 
loan demand or high interest rates). Although countries differ in how they define their 
monetary base, they generally include some combination of money in circulation and demand 
deposits held by the central bank for financial institutions. Id. at 267–69. 
 31. See Hildebrand, supra note 27 (laying out the general approach of SWF investment 
choices, which tends toward foreign assets). 
 32. See Belinda Cao, China’s $200 Billion Sovereign Fund Begins Operations (Update 1), 
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 29, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aGy8fzTT25.w (reporting the statements of various Chinese 
officials involved with the creation of its SWF including that the SWF would keep tolerable 
risks in mind while investing). 
 33. See Hildebrand, supra note 27 (explaining that SWFs can act in a manner unfamiliar 
to regulators because they are not required to make specific payments, such as pension funds 
that pay pensioners at a delineated time); see also Edwin M. Truman, Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
The Need for Greater Transparency and Accountability, Policy Brief Number PB 07–6, 9 
(Institute for International Economics, Aug. 2007) (positing that the idea that because SWFs 
have no explicit liabilities, they may resist pulling out of markets when there are economic 
downturns and help stabilize the international financial system). Truman questions the role 
SWFs will ultimately play in the international financial system. Id. But see WEISS, supra note 13 
(noting that the Chinese SWF must service a debt load of $40 million per day). 
 34. See Hildebrand, supra note 27, at 2 (arguing that this is a critical difference between 
SWFs and pension funds). 
 35. See First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba, 462 U.S. 
611, 628 (1983) (holding “the presumption that a foreign government’s determination that 
its instrumentality is to be accorded separate legal status is buttressed by” the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act); see also ROGNVALDUR HANNESSON, INVESTING FOR 
SUSTAINABILITY: THE MANAGEMENT OF MINERAL WEALTH 42 (2001) 
(questioning the ultimate autonomy of an SWF in a democratic society because institutions are 
accountable to politicians and politicians are ultimately accountable to the populace, but 
stating that it should nonetheless be set up as an autonomous institution). SWF autonomy in a 
non-democratic society remains unclear, as the causal link between the institution and the 
populace is more tenuous than in a democratic society. Id. 
 36. See Ewart S. Williams, Governor, Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, Feature 
Address to the South Trinidad Chamber of Commerce Annual General Meeting: 
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The primary objective of an SWF is to maximize the risk/return 
equation (r/r equation).37 A central bank’s primary objective is to 
eliminate risk with little concern for the return on the investment.38 
In addition, because SWFs have a longer investment time horizon, 
they can diversify away from short-term liquid asset classes and invest 
in long-term illiquid asset classes.39 
 
Understanding the Heritage and Stabilization Fund, 1–2 (Sept. 20, 2007) available at 
http://www.bis.org/review/r071004d.pdf (elucidating that central banks hold reserves for 
prudential purposes and have liquidity as their chief consideration). Prudential concerns dictate 
that central banks invest in order to maintain the stability of the financial system under their 
care, and the implication of this concern is to focus on high liquidity when choosing its asset 
allocation strategy, i.e., central banks invest primarily in short to medium-term low-risk assets 
that are highly fungible with cash. Id. See also A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, 
supra note 30, at 330 (stating that banks with prudential concerns exercise an added degree of 
caution beyond covering their monetary base). Liquidity means the degree to which a bank can 
quickly exchange its assets for cash, or the financial system regards its assets as fungible with 
another currency. Id. at 239–40. Thus, high liquidity means that a bank can easily exchange its 
assets for cash, which is important in a financial crisis when the central bank needs to sure up 
the banking system by giving cash to banks. Id. Asset allocation is how a bank decides to 
allocate its capital between high and low liquid assets. Id. 
 37. See generally Investing Concepts: Investing Basics, The Motley Fool, 
http://www.fool.com/school/basics/basics02.htm (giving a basic definition of investment 
terms, which serve to illuminate the choice between risk and return leading to the implication 
that there is some restriction on SWF activity). The risk/return equation represents the 
essential choice that investors face; that is, whether they want more security in an investment 
with a lower rate of return, or a higher return and less security. Id. This choice is illustrated by 
the difference between securities, where there is the potential to lose all of the investment, but 
there is the possibility for tremendous appreciation, and relatively risk-free 3-month U.S. 
Treasury Bills that offer a lower rate of return. Id. 
 38. See Williams, supra note 36, at 3–4 (stating that nature or source of a country’s 
excess reserves may dictate how an SWF maximizes the r/r equation). The Trinidad and 
Tobago SWF would not invest in assets directly related to oil and gas because this is the source 
of Trinidad and Tobago’s excess reserves. Id. SWFs can maximize the r/r equation by shifting 
away from liquidity as their primary objective and investing in assets that produce a higher 
return, but are less liquid. Id. See also HANNESSON, supra note 35, at 40–43 (arguing that 
before a government sets up an SWF it must make a basic choice between investing in 
infrastructure, health, and education, or choosing to invest “in projects that are profitable on 
the basis of conventional market criteria”). Countries seek to provide funds as opposed to 
other investments for future generations. This allows future generations to spend the money as 
they see fit. Id. Cf. Keith Bradsher, China Faces Backlash at Home Over Blackstone Investment, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 2, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/ 
02/opinion/backlash.php (quoting one anonymous Chinese blogger who admonishes the 
government stating that “[t]he foreign reserves are the product of the sweat and blood of the 
people of China, please invest them with more care!”). 
 39. See Y. V. Reddy, Governor, Reserve Bank of India, Address at the Golden Jubilee 
Celebrations of the Foreign Exchange Dealers’ Association of India: Forex Reserves, 
Stabilization Funds and Sovereign Wealth Funds – Indian Perspective, 1 (Oct. 8, 2007) in BIS 
Review, Nov. 3, 2007 available at http://www.bis.org/review/r071009b.pdf (explaining 
that a central bank’s goal is to have sufficient reserves to cover its monetary base, whereas, 
SWFs are seeking a return higher than is necessary to preserve the real value of their reserves), 
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2. Fiduciary duty and modern financial techniques 
Governments employ a series of techniques to circumvent 
potential conflicts of central bankers’ interests. A central banker has 
the fiduciary duty to operate funds in the best interest of her country 
and would violate that duty if she allowed ever-increasing reserves to 
reside in low-yielding liquid assets.40 Therefore, the government sets 
up a separate entity with different reserve management objectives, 
and the fiduciary duty to manage the reserves in the best interests of 
the country remains.41 In order to meet this fiduciary duty while 
maximizing the r/r equation, SWFs engage in many of the modern 
finance techniques that allow them to hedge some of their risk.42 
 
and Bradsher, supra note 38 (discussing that SWFs are still beholden to the public and must 
answer for poor investment decisions). The Chinese public expressed concern over unrealized 
losses by the Chinese SWF in its investment in the U.S. private equity firm Blackstone, and the 
speedy nature of the decision to invest in the U.S. alternative asset manager. Id. See also 
Williams, supra note 36 (explaining that to avoid contagion with potential domestic economic 
troubles, some SWFs limit their possible investment choices strictly to foreign investments). 
This concern leads to the strict prohibition against domestic investments by the Trinidad and 
Tobago SWF. Id. 
 40. See The World’s Most Expensive Club, supra note 15 (showing the question becomes 
more pertinent as reserves mushroom because of the opportunity cost associated with unspent 
funds). 
 41. See HANNESSON, supra note 35, at 42–43 (arguing that there is an opportunity cost 
to creating an SWF with forgoing fiscal spending as the main downside cost, which raises the 
question of whether spending domestically, or saving in foreign assets is in the best interests of 
the country); see also Bradsher, supra note 38 (noting that the public may take a different view 
over how to invest a country’s excess reserves). 
 42. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
677–78 (Aspen L. & Bus. 2001) (discussing the reasoning behind modern day investment 
techniques and offering a compelling reason why any financial market participant would utilize 
derivatives and futures investing tools). Loss and Seligman state that according to the efficient 
market hypothesis, which is a theory that the market will disseminate information broadly to all 
market participants, investors cannot out-trade each other because of superior information. Id. 
Investors then rely on portfolio theory, where they divide the risk in the portfolio into firm 
specific risk (“alpha”) and overall market risk (“beta”). Id. The diversification of assets virtually 
eliminates alpha risk, and investors manage beta risk according to their individual r/r equation, 
or asset allocation strategy. Id. Presently, some investors attempt to limit their beta risk by 
engaging in futures and derivative trades tied to stock indexes or underlying stocks. Id. There 
are two potential implications for SWFs: they may seek to gain superior information through 
improper means, or they will need to enter into contracts with banks in order to hedge their 
beta risk. Id. See also ROBERT A. HAUGEN, MODERN INVESTMENT THEORY 1 (5th. Ed., 
Prentice Hall 2001) (arguing that modern investment theory is widely practiced, which implies 
a broad dissemination of modern finance techniques). Setting up hedged positions through 
futures and options contracts is an integral part of modern investment theory. Id.; cf. A 
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, supra note 30, at 174 (defining a future as a 
contract to make a definite purchase of an asset at a set point in the future). An option is a 
contract whereby the option holder has the right to purchase an asset at a set price and 
predetermined date. A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, supra note 30, at 295. 
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SWFs are prone to the unique risks that accompany investments in 
foreign denominated assets.43 SWFs enter into various contracts to 
hedge against the risk of currency devaluations, interest rate 
fluctuations, or simply using equity derivatives to hedge a position.44 
Thus, the SWF becomes a “counterparty” to an investment contract 
because it cannot hedge its positions alone.45 
C. Current U.S. Regulatory Approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds 
SWFs, like hedge funds, are not regulated directly. The current 
approach to the regulation of SWFs and hedge funds46 is to “watch 
carefully over the regulated intermediaries that lend to them.”47 This 
is ineffective, however, because SWFs generally would not need to 
borrow large sums of money.48 Their very existence suggests that the 
 
 43. See Williams, supra note 36 (arguing that because SWFs are diversifying away from 
possible domestic contagion they will necessarily be investing in foreign denominated assets 
and therefore facing additional risks because of the nature of these assets). See generally EZRA 
ZASK, ED., GLOBAL INVESTMENT RISK MANAGEMENT: PROTECTING INTERNATIONAL 
PORTFOLIOS AGAINST CURRENCY, INTEREST RATE, EQUITY, AND COMMODITY RISK 
(McGraw-Hill 2000) (offering frameworks that an SWF may use to mitigate the myriad risks 
inherent in foreign asset investment). 
 44. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 42, at 713–14 (stating that the use of derivatives 
to mitigate an investor’s exposure to the risk associated with foreign assets can create 
“substantial risks” for other market participants). 
 45. See A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, supra note 30, at 95 (defining a 
counterparty as “a party to a contract” and counterparty risk as “[t]he risk that either of the 
parties to a contract (counterparties) will fail to honor their obligations under the contract”); 
see also Norman Feder, Deconstructing Over-The-Counter Derivatives, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
677, 722–25 (2002) (describing counterparty risk as a subset of credit risk and different from 
settlement risk, although, at least in the short term, both may result in the party to the 
transaction not being paid when it is time for settlement). 
 46. See The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, 
and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management 1 (April 1999) [hereinafter Hedge Fund 
Report] (arguing that many different types of investment vehicles fall under the definition of 
hedge fund). Hedge funds tend to “use leverage aggressively” and “pursue short-term 
investment strategies.” Id. at 2. See also CATHERINE TURNER, INTERNATIONAL FUNDS: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THEIR ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION 88 (Elsevier Ltd. 2004) 
(arguing that the first “true hedge fund” engaged in both short selling and leverage); cf. A 
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, supra note 30, at 236 (stating that leverage exists 
when the principal is small compared to the risks, i.e., a hedge fund uses a small portion of its 
own funds and borrows the rest to pay for a derivative position, thereby using a small amount 
of assets to create a highly leveraged position). 
 47. See Johnson, supra note 20 (stating that these regulated intermediaries are 
commercial and investment banks). 
 48. See Hedge Fund Report, supra note 46, at 1–2 (giving a working definition of 
hedge funds and noting their prevalent use of leverage to boost overall returns on capital); see 
also supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the cumulative size of SWFs and their 
potential for growth). It remains to be seen if the fiduciary duties that motivate an SWF to 
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countries which form them have excess cash. 
The SEC would essentially be regulating investors if they were to 
attempt to regulate SWFs. This notion contradicts the ethos of the 
disclosure system created by the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)49 
and the 1934 Act.50 The SEC does regulate certain activities by 
investors, e.g., insider trading.51 The most pertinent of the 
regulations affecting investors is the five percent requirement under 
the 1934 Act, whereby an investor acquiring more than five percent 
of a company must file a statement with the securities issuer and the 
SEC.52 This statement discloses the investor’s background, identity, 
residence, and the nature of the ownership, to the issuer and the 
SEC. Additionally, an investor may become an issuer53 and receive 
 
pursue higher returns will also motivate it to utilize leverage in a manner similar to hedge 
funds in an effort to boost their return on capital. 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 77a–aa (2008). 
 50. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78a–nn (2008) (providing for mandatory disclosures or 
abstention from the securities market when the sale or purchase of securities meets certain 
threshold requirements, such as a sale by insiders). 
 51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (prohibiting the use of manipulative and deceptive devices by 
“any person”). The inclusion of the phrase “any person” allows for the prosecution of people 
traditionally not considered insiders. Id. Rule 10b5-1 allows the SEC to prosecute a variety of 
individuals who engage in insider trading. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). See LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 42, at 855–56 (stating that rule 10b-5 of the ‘34 Act applies “whenever 
any person—insider or outsider—indulges in fraudulent practices, misstatements, or half-truths 
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.”). There are three arguments in favor of 
preventing insider trading: Equity, Allocative Efficiency, and Property Rights. Id. at 855–59. 
The Equity argument favors the proscription of trading while possessing material non-public 
information due to an “integrity of the market” theory where more investors will invest in a 
market that prevents insider trading. Id. at 857. The Allocative Efficiency argument is to 
remove the incentive to delay information disclosure. Id. at 858. The Property Rights 
argument views information as corporate property and is especially persuasive where 
corporations utilize their own resources to develop that information. Id. at 859. Of the three 
arguments presented by Loss and Seligman, the Public Confidence and Property Rights 
arguments are the better justifications for SWF regulation. SWFs have the potential to 
undermine public confidence because they may not have profit as their main motive, and they 
could utilize national intelligence resources to steal proprietary information to achieve a better 
return or avoid a loss. Id. at 857, 859. 
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (requiring persons owning more than five percent of any class 
of security to notify the issuer and the SEC). The notification must include: the purchaser’s 
background, identity, residence, citizenship, and the nature of the ownership. Id. § 
78m(d)(1)(A). Additionally, the purchaser must state the source of the funds, whether it 
intends to acquire control of the company, the number of shares that it owns, and any 
contracts or arrangements it may have concerning the issuer, including puts or calls. Id. § 
78m(d)(1)(B)–(D). 
 53. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4) (defining issuer as a person who issues any security); see 
also 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (requiring issuers to furnish certain information in their registration 
statement when issuing securities). 
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liability exposure54 by selling unregistered securities through a 
company that it controls.55 Finally, a beneficial owner, who is defined 
as a director, officer, or shareholder owning more than ten percent 
of a §12 company, is subject to a number of different provisions of 
the 1934 Act that potentially increase a beneficial owner’s liability.56 
D. Testing the Sovereign Immunity of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Before delving into the international framework for regulating 
SWFs, it is necessary to understand the domestic context of bringing 
a foreign governmental entity under U.S. jurisdiction. In response to 
litigation brought on by U.S. regulators, an SWF would likely invoke 
one or all of the following three doctrines: sovereign immunity, the 
act of state doctrine, and international comity.57 It is important to 
understand the judicial challenges before evaluating the effectiveness 
of any regulation through international agreements because it may 
render the entire discussion of U.S. regulation of SWFs through 
international agreements purely theoretical. 
1. Restrictive theory of sovereign immunity 
SEC Chairman Cox states that SWFs are not beyond U.S. 
jurisdiction when violating securities laws.58 The Foreign Sovereign 
 
 54. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (creating a private right of action for any purchaser of a security 
accompanied by a false registration statement). 
 55. See Blackstone Group, L.P., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 4 (June 11, 
2007) (filing a registration statement stating the Chinese SWF purchased a less than ten 
percent stake in the U.S. alternative asset manager, which suggests the SWF is attempting to 
limit its liability exposure). 
 56. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (creating monetary liability for beneficial owners who do 
not adhere to certain restrictions on the timing of sales or purchases of securities related to 
those that they own). 
 57. See Power, supra note 9, at 2723–41 (discussing the hurdles to suing a sovereign 
entity in U.S. courts in the context of sovereign debt defaults). 
 58. See Cox, supra note 4 (arguing that neither the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
nor international law prevents the SEC from pursuing enforcement action against SWFs). The 
implication of Cox’s statement is that SWFs fall within the commercial activity exception to 
sovereign immunity. Id. Additionally, he wonders whether the SEC would be able to follow its 
traditional approach of soliciting a foreign securities regulator’s assistance in securing evidence 
to prosecute an SWF controlled by the very government from which the SEC is requesting 
assistance. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court supports Cox’s assertion in its examination of a 
sovereign debt case holding, “[W]hen a foreign government acts, not as a regulator of a 
market, but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign sovereign’s actions are 
‘commercial’ within the meaning of the FSIA.” Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 
(1992); see also Power, supra note 9, at 2729–32 (analyzing the application of the Weltover 
decision to the sovereign debt crisis and its implication for sovereign immunity claims). 
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Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), codified the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity.59 The restrictive theory states that there are 
exceptions whereby a court can exercise jurisdiction over a sovereign 
entity. The most widely noted restriction in FSIA limiting a foreign 
state’s sovereign immunity, aside from an express waiver, is the 
commercial activity and property exception.60 
2. Act of state doctrine 
The act of state doctrine is a judicially created rule that bars U.S. 
courts from determining the validity of a foreign state’s official acts 
performed within its sovereign territory even when a U.S. court 
otherwise has jurisdiction.61 Unlike the case with sovereign 
immunity, the rule is not waivable.62 In order to qualify as a 
jurisdictional bar, the act of state doctrine requires that a U.S. court 
“declare invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign performed 
within its own territory.”63 
3. International comity 
Comity64 is similar to the act of state doctrine in that it is not a 
 
 59. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2008); see Power, supra note 9, at 2728 (positing that 
FSIA starts from the premise that foreign states are immune from U.S. court jurisdiction, but 
that it creates a number of exceptions, which gives rise to the “restrictive” theory). 
 60. 28 U.S.C. § 1602; see Power, supra note 9, at 2727–28 (stating that three kinds of 
activity implicate the commercial activity exception: 1) commercial activity in the United 
States; 2) acts “performed in the United States in connection with commercial activity carried 
on outside the United States;” and 3) acts “performed outside the United States in connection 
with a commercial activity carried on outside the United States, which act has a direct effect in 
the United States.”) 
 61. See Power, supra note 9, at 2733–34 (giving various reasons for the rule and 
applications of it, e.g., the inability to grant effective relief, comity, and deference to the 
executive branch in foreign affairs). 
 62. Id. at 2732 (stating that “[t]he most important limitation on the doctrine’s 
effectiveness [as a sovereign’s defense] in collection actions is its requirement that the 
challenged act of state be performed within the sovereign’s own territory”). With banking and 
investment decisions made through electronic communication it is necessary to consider the 
effects of an act because an analysis that an SWF official is in her country when phoning in an 
order would always result in the application of the act of state doctrine. Id. at 2734. 
 63. See W.S. Kirkpatrick v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404–05 (1990) 
(deciding that the act of state doctrine does not apply when a U.S. court does not need to pass 
judgment on the validity of a foreign sovereign’s actions or where a plaintiff seeks to disregard 
a governmental action). The Court suggests in dictum that the act of state doctrine would not 
apply when comity or sovereign immunity do not apply to a transaction because of its 
commercial nature. Id. Additionally, the Court notes that even “modern” conceptions of 
international comity do not recognize sovereign immunity for commercial transactions. Id. 
 64. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 114 (3d Pocket ed. 2006) (defining comity as the 
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rule of law,65 but comity differs in two key respects: (1) there is no 
territorial limitation for the doctrine of comity, and (2) the acts 
under consideration must be consistent with the laws of the United 
States in order for a court to apply the doctrine.66 In essence, the 
doctrine is broader than the act of state doctrine, but the restriction 
that the action must be consistent with U.S. law and policy does not 
offer protection to those potentially violating U.S. laws.67 An analysis 
of comity within the context of sovereign debt defaults demonstrates 
the limited usefulness of this doctrine to a would-be violator of U.S. 
law.68 
E. Sovereign Entity Status Will Not Bar the Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts 
SWFs cannot shield themselves from the jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts through any of the doctrines outlined above. FSIA requires a 
two-step analysis to determine whether the commercial activity 
exception to sovereign immunity applies in a given situation.69 The 
first step is to determine whether the activity is commercial in 
nature.70 SWFs engage in an activity for the benefit of the state, but 
their activities are commercial in nature because they invest seeking a 
profit instead of investing to protect the financial stability of the 
country by maintaining liquidity.71 The second step is to determine 
whether the commercial activity is conducted in the United States or 
has a direct effect on the United States.72 
 
practice among different nations involving mutual recognition of each other’s actions). 
 65. Power, supra note 9, at 2738; compare Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing 
Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971) (describing that comity is not a rule of law, 
but a judicial doctrine, which seems to imply some flexibility with its application), with First 
Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762–65 (1972) (discussing the 
origins of the act of state doctrine within the United States and how it is not an inflexible 
doctrine). 
 66. See Power, supra note 9, at 2738 (applying the notion of comity to the sovereign 
debt crisis and finding it did not prevent a U.S. court’s exercise of jurisdiction). 
 67. Id. at 2738–39. 
 68. See id. at 2738–41 (analyzing the utility of comity as a defense in sovereign debt 
defaults and finding that the debts would be inconsistent with U.S. policy—except in a case 
involving Costa Rica where the administration at the time expressed support for Costa Rica’s 
policy—and thus, the defense would fail). 
 69. See 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2). 
 70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (defining commercial activity and explicitly stating that the 
commercial nature of activities is to be determined by the nature of its course of conduct and 
not according to its stated purpose). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See Power, supra note 9, at 2728 (arguing that commercial activity in the United 
States, performed in connection with the United States, and acts affecting the United States 
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For an SWF investing in U.S. entities, its investments naturally 
have “substantial contact” with the United States because its 
investments would need to be in U.S. regulated entities to invoke 
the scrutiny of a U.S. regulator.73 Thus, FSIA’s embodiment of the 
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity with its commercial activity 
exception clearly negates the use of sovereign immunity as a bar to 
U.S. court jurisdiction over SWFs.74 SWFs seek to achieve a higher 
rate of return on the funds entrusted to it, and this necessarily 
implicates the commercial activity exception to sovereign 
immunity.75 
Any potential SWF transactions of concern to U.S. regulators 
would likely occur within the United States.76 Repayment of 
sovereign debt, the closest analogy to the actors in an SWF 
transaction, is stipulated in a certain currency with payment 
designated in the country of the intermediary.77 Possible incidents of 
insider trading, market manipulation, or irregularities with respect to 
large block trading likely result in a nullification of the act of state 
doctrine because the challenged action is not performed within the 
sovereign’s territory.78 Whether there is nullification of the act of 
state doctrine likely depends on a contractual analysis determining 
the place of payment.79 The act of state doctrine does not apply 
 
will result in denial of sovereign immunity); see also supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text 
(discussing the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and the conditions necessary for 
piercing the sovereign veil without an express waiver). 
 73. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(c) (defining the United States as all territory “subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States,” which implies that all entities subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States fall within this definition). 
 74. 28 U.S.C. § 1602; see Cox, supra note 4 (stating that neither international law nor 
FSIA would render SWFs immune from U.S. jurisdiction). 
 75. See Williams, supra note 36 (emphasizing the difference between a central bank’s 
prudential management of reserves and an SWF seeking a higher rate of return). 
 76. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 4 (noting that should an SWF engage in insider trading it 
would adversely impact the SEC’s mission to protect U.S. investors). 
 77. See, e.g., Power, supra note 9, at 2735–37 (discussing the act of state doctrine and 
its application to the sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s where many Latin American countries 
defaulted on loans requiring intervention by the United States and other developed countries). 
 78. But cf. id. at 2733–34 (realizing that the act of state doctrine may apply where a 
court could not grant substantial relief, but courts routinely grant awards even when there is 
little chance of the party receiving it). 
 79. See Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S. 660, 666–67 (leaving 
undisturbed the District Court’s holding that repayment occurred where stipulated in the 
contract regardless of the location of collection). The Court of Appeals suggested that the 
“repayment” and “collection” are not divisible concepts, but ultimately upheld the decision 
because the parties stipulated a different branch location for collection. Id. at 666–68. See also 
supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for the application of 
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when a foreign sovereign’s official act is not at issue.80 The possibility 
of a judgment barring repayment under the act of state doctrine 
increases the counterparty’s risk in a transaction.81 
SWFs challenge the notion of comity for financial regulators 
operating in an international context. Domestic regulators are faced 
with the bottom-line issue that when “government is both the 
regulator and the regulated . . . the opportunity for political 
corruption increases.”82 In theory, comity calls for U.S. agencies to 
recognize the executive acts of other nations, but in practice, 
recognizing the executive acts of another nation may mean that the 
SEC is not able to fully prevent abuses by SWFs.83 
SEC Chairman Cox’s concern about the government being the 
regulator and the regulated conjures up images of a monolithic 
government, one which simultaneously invests and regulates 
investors. However, this notion is imprecise as SWFs are specifically 
established as separate government entities.84 Comity generally 
prescribes that U.S. agencies do not interfere with the inner 
workings of a foreign government, yet SWF participation in the U.S. 
financial system constitutes action that affects U.S. markets over 
which a foreign regulator exercises no control.85 SWFs could not 
seek refuge under the principles of comity because their actions 
logically would be violations of U.S. law if the SEC seeks to enforce 
 
the act of state doctrine). 
 80. See Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404–05 (suggesting that the act of state doctrine does 
not apply in a commercial context for sovereign entities). 
 81. Cf. Feder, supra note 45, at 723–24 (arguing that the insolvency of a counterparty 
would not necessarily cause an “out-of-pocket loss” to the “innocent party,” but it would leave 
the innocent party without fulfillment of the contractual obligation it bargained for). 
 82. Cox, supra note 4. 
 83. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 64 (including mutual recognition 
of foreign executive action in its definition of comity), with Cox, supra note 4 (arguing that 
the lack of a severance between the regulator and the regulated undermines the SEC’s 
confidence in the ability of that regulator to do its job effectively, and thus, undermining the 
concept of comity). 
 84. See First Nat’l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 628 (holding that these is a presumption of 
separate legal status for government created entities); see also supra notes 35–38 and 
accompanying text (noting that SWFs are set up as a separate entity from central banks because 
they are engaging in a different style of reserve asset management, whereas a securities 
regulator does not participate in the management of a country’s reserves). 
 85. See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, 545 U.S. 119, 120 (2005) (holding that a 
“clear statement of congressional intent” is needed before using a statutory requirement to 
interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign-flag vessel). The Court holds that it is reasonable to 
presume that interference with the inner workings of a state is not the intent of congressional 
action, but it is Congress’ intent to regulate those actions that affect U.S. citizens. Id. at 121. 
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a securities law provision. Additionally, because there is no territorial 
limitation to comity, the SWF status as a foreign entity does not 
provide an exception to apply these principles.86 
F. Using International Agreements to Further the Mandate of 
Protecting U.S. Investors 
In light of the U.S. domestic limitations on SWF, this Comment 
now turns to international agreements intended to protect U.S. 
investors. The SEC and the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) both seek to protect U.S. investors but achieve their 
objectives in different manners. The USTR attempts to prevent 
foreign government interference in investments by U.S. investors.87 
In contrast, the SEC protects investors from fraudulent activity by 
companies operating domestically and abroad.88 Despite their 
different approaches, both agencies recognize the importance of 
collaborating with other countries to achieve their respective goals.89 
This Comment next considers the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty and the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding. 
1. U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) were implemented in the 
1960s to provide “a stable international framework for the 
regulation of foreign direct investment.”90 BITs are most effective in 
two key areas: (1) providing for the protection of investments, and 
(2) providing a forum for the resolution of investment disputes.91 
 
 86. See Power, supra note 9, at 2738–41 (noting the limited utility of comity as a 
defense when actions are inconsistent with U.S. policy). 
 87. See USTR, Summary of U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) Program, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/BIT/Summary_of_US_Bilateral_Investment_Treat
y_(BIT)_Program.html [hereinafter Summary] (stating that the BIT program attempts to 
provide protection to U.S. citizens investing in countries that may lack effective investor 
protection). 
 88. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–nn (creating a disclosure system for regulated 
companies in the U.S. market). 
 89. See generally IOSCO MOU, supra note 8 (providing a mechanism for the SEC to 
request information concerning its operations that may affect participants located in other 
countries). 
 90. See David Adair, Comment, Investors’ Rights: The Evolutionary Process of Investment 
Treaties, 6 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 195, 197 (1999) (analyzing the evolution of 
investment treaties and how they serve to protect the individual investor unaccustomed to the 
risks of investing in foreign markets). 
 91. See id. at 198 (arguing that the BIT is a key improvement over the previous treaties 
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BITs serve as binding statements of international law that allow 
parties to seek redress from a third party arbitrator.92 The 2004 U.S. 
Model BIT is the most recent version of the template the USTR uses 
when it negotiates with foreign governments to create a bilateral 
investment treaty.93 U.S. BITs provide investors with several benefits, 
including the assurance that foreign investments receive the same 
treatment as domestic investments.94 
2. The International Organization of Securities Commissions’ 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
The International Organization of Securities Commissions 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (IOSCO MOU) is a 
non-binding arrangement between securities regulators to encourage 
information sharing concerning cross-border securities violations.95 
In addition to a number of foreign financial services regulators, the 
U.S. SEC and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
are parties to the IOSCO MOU.96 The signatories to the MOU 
pledge to exchange information in the investigation of securities and 
futures trading violations.97 The IOSCO MOU serves as an example 
of regulatory equivalence rather than harmonization because the 
participants have no obligation to change their securities laws.98 
 
known as Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties (“FCNs”), which Adair regards as 
the “first step in the evolutionary process of the regulation of investment”). 
 92. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 7, art. 24 (allowing for submission of investment 
disputes to an independent arbitrator that adheres to international arbitration rules). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Summary, supra note 87 (explaining the benefits of the BIT program). The 
other five benefits are: (1) they establish limits on the expropriation of investments, (2) they 
require market foreign exchange rates, (3) they “restrict the imposition of performance 
requirements, such as local content targets or export quotas,” (4) they allow investors to 
choose their management, and (5) they provide international arbitration for the resolution of 
investment disputes. Id. 
 95. See IOSCO MOU, supra note 8, § 6(a) (emphasizing the parties’ intent to mutually 
assist one another, but explicitly stating that the provisions are not binding). 
 96. Press Release, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n (CFTC), U.S. 
Commodities Trading Commission Announces Participation in IOSCO Multilateral 
Enforcement MOU, CFTC 4851–03 (Oct. 16, 2003). 
 97. See id. (outlining the broad categories of offenses it seeks to prosecute using the 
IOSCO MOU). The MOU builds on 21 previous bilateral enforcement agreements signed by 
the CFTC. Id. 
 98. See Jorge E. Vinuales, The International Regulation of Financial Conglomerates: A 
Case Study of Equivalence as an Approach to Financial Integration, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L.J., 1, 4 
(2006) (arguing that equivalence is a more effective approach because different regulatory 
regimes can achieve similar goals without applying similar standards, thus allowing a foreign 
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G. International Financial System Agreements 
Broadly, the international financial system is comprised of central 
banks, central monetary authorities, and the financial intermediaries 
that they regulate.99 The Basel II Accord is the means by which 
central bankers coordinate the regulation of financial intermediaries, 
which allows those intermediaries to compete on a level playing 
field.100 The IMF Articles of Agreement provide the means for 
countries to coordinate their exchange rate policies and to provide 
information about reserve management.101 Both of these agreements 
offer potential avenues for U.S. regulation of SWFs. 
1. Basel II Accord 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) created 
the Basel II Accord102 to fashion a more flexible approach to 
managing banks’ capital adequacy in an effort to ensure the stability 
 
regulator to determine that an information request does not comply with its standards, whereas 
harmonization would require regulatory regimes to have the same rules, thus requiring them 
to honor information requests); see generally IOSCO MOU, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that the 
purpose of the MOU is to ensure compliance with domestic laws). The IOSCO MOU is not a 
normative document and does not provide for prescriptive changes to individual signatories’ 
regulatory regimes. Id. 
 99. See BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 75 (Princeton Univ. Press 1996) (indicating that central 
banks are the lenders of last resort for the banks that they regulate). 
 100. See generally Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework 2 (June 
2004) [hereinafter Basel II Accord] (offering a greatly revised capital adequacy standard so that 
internationally active banks face the same regulatory standards instead of each country dictating 
its own reserve requirements to the banks it regulates). 
 101. IMF Articles, supra note 12. 
 102. See BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (BIS), THE BIS IN PROFILE (Sept. 
2007), available at http://www.bis.org/about/profile.pdf. (explaining that the BIS is a group 
of 55 central bankers and monetary supervisors, which have representation and voting at its 
General Meetings). The “Group of Ten” countries established the BCBS in the aftermath of a 
banking crisis in 1974. Id. See also A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, supra note 30, 
at 189–90 (stating that the group originally began as a group of lenders for the IMF); BCBS, 
HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERSHIP, (Jan. 2007), available at 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm [hereinafter HISTORY]. Currently, it has thirteen 
members and is one of the five main committees of the BIS. Id. See also BIS, MONETARY AND 
FINANCIAL STABILITY–OVERVIEW, available at http://www.bis.org/stability.htm (describing 
the breakdown of the committees housed at BIS). While the BCBS is not a formal supervisory 
authority, it recommends standards and guidelines in an effort to have those implemented by 
the individual authorities. Id. See also HISTORY, supra (suggesting that it does not possess any 
authority is a bit of a misstatement because its members do have the authority in many 
instances to impose its decisions). 
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of the international banking system while not creating any 
competitive disadvantage for internationally active banks.103 The 
Basel II Accord represents the efforts of its central bank and 
monetary authority members who utilize a soft law approach to 
promulgate their “principles and codes of conduct and best 
practices.”104 Individual members of the BCBS implement the 
measures included in the Basel II Accord.105 The Accord uses a 
“Three Pillar” system of protecting the international banking system 
from various risks by assuring that internationally active banks and 
their holding companies have reserved enough capital in case these 
risks materialize.106 The Three Pillars are Minimum Capital 
Requirements, Supervisory Review Process, and Market Discipline.107 
The amount of capital a bank must set aside for a particular 
transaction depends upon with whom it is interacting, or, in other 
words, how big a capital charge a bank must take.108 
The key to the First Pillar, Minimum Capital Requirements, of 
the Basel II Accord is the credit assessment of the entities with which 
banks interact. An SWF’s potential classification under the Basel II 
 
 103. See generally Basel II Accord, supra note 100 (laying out its mandate of maintaining 
stability and competitive equality). The prevention of regulatory arbitrage and the force of the 
market may not allow regulators to make substantial changes in the BCBS’ Basel II Accord. See 
also U.S. Final Rule, supra note 12 (implementing the Basel II Accord in the United States, 
and noting that U.S. commentators reacted against changes from the BCBS proposals because 
the changes would likely impose higher costs, create competitiveness issues, and increase 
regulatory burden without improving overall safety and soundness). 
 104. Joseph J. Norton, An Interim Filling the Gap in Multilateral, Regional, and 
Domestic Hard Law Deficiencies Respecting Financial Services within the Americas, 12 LAW & 
BUS. REV. AM. 153, 159 (2006) (arguing that the soft law process may not work for other 
financial regulator “standard-setters” like the IOSCO MOU signatories). 
 105. Basel II Accord, supra note 100, at 1; see U.S. Final Rule, supra note 12, at 1 
(stating that four agencies adopted the Basel II Accord in the United States due to their 
overlapping regulatory functions with respect to banking). These agencies are the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Treasury, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Id. 
 106. See Basel II Accord, supra note 100, passim (describing the composition and 
utilization of the three pillar system as an effort to provide a more efficient capital adequacy 
requirement). Id. at 6. 
 107. Id. at 6. The pillars are mutually supportive as the disclosures under the third pillar 
“effectively complement” the other two pillars by enforcing market discipline. Id. at 3. One of 
the keys to this approach is disclosure by banks of risks on their balance sheets. Id. at 6. 
 108. See id. at 15–47 (outlining the Standardised [sic] Approach to measuring credit 
risk). The credit assessment determines how much risk weight must be applied to claims on 
various types of entities. Id. The risk weight can range from 20% to 150% depending on the 
credit assessment of the borrower. Id. When a party has a better credit assessment the bank sets 
aside less capital and, therefore, can finance more deals because it is taking a smaller capital 
charge. Id. 
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Accord is as a Public Sector Entity (PSE).109 Whether to give the 
SWF the same credit assessment as the sovereign, or as a normal 
commercial entity, is at the bank’s discretion.110 SWFs engaging in 
atypical transactions when compared to the average sovereign 
borrower, or institutional investor, complicate the decision for 
banks.111 
2. The IMF Articles of Agreement and disclosure requirements 
concerning foreign exchange reserves 
In addition to the Basel II Accord, the IMF is an organization 
that monitors the management of reserve assets by its members. 
Seemingly, it offers the primary mechanism for regulation of SWFs 
because they manage reserve assets. The IMF Articles of Agreement 
govern IMF operations and constitute a non-self-executing treaty in 
the sense that they do not create a private right of action.112 Rather, 
they create a horizontal relationship between states.113 
The framers of the IMF Articles of Agreement designed them for 
the post World War II exchange rate system with the U.S. dollar as 
the centerpiece of the system.114 Indeed, the use of the dollar as the 
centerpiece of the system led in part to the holdings of excess 
 
 109. Cf. id. at 15–16 (revealing that SWFs could be accorded the same treatment as the 
sovereign or the central bank, or because of their commercial nature could be treated as a 
normal commercial enterprise). This is a discretionary decision by the bank, and the bank 
would need to examine the specific institutional arrangement of the SWF and its relationship 
to the central bank. Id. For example, if the SWF were guaranteed a certain share of profits per 
year from a country’s mineral resource production, then this may qualify as a specific revenue 
raising power, and allow the bank to more easily justify giving the SWF the same credit 
assessment as the sovereign or central bank. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., Hildebrand, supra note 27 (demonstrating that SWFs do not need to raise 
funds; they need to invest funds). 
 112. See Sloss & Jinks, U.S. Chapter (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript on file with 
author) (stating that creating a private right of action is one of the three understandings of a 
non-self-executing treaty, and the other two are it “lacks the force of law, or that it is not 
judicially enforceable”); see also Em Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., 473 F.3d 463, 482–83 (2d Cir. 
2007) (describing that the powers exercised under the IMF Articles of Agreement are 
sovereign in nature). Only sovereign states can sign the treaty and avail themselves of its 
resources. Id. 
 113. See Sloss & Jinks, supra note 112, at 6 (noting that the other two relationships are 
“vertical relationships between states and private parties, and private transactions between 
private parties.”). Thus, it makes sense that treaties predicated on horizontal relationships 
would be non-self-executing because they do not create private rights of action. Id. 
 114. See generally EICHENGREEN, supra note 99, at 93–135 (describing how the British 
members of the Bretton Woods Conference did not want the dollar to be the centerpiece, but 
relented in their demands). 
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reserves in dollar-denominated assets.115 It is in these assets that 
SWFs are now investing.116 The Articles of Agreement require that 
member states collaborate on exchange rate policy, which implicates 
the management of reserve assets, and that they share information 
regarding reserve assets.117 
III. ANALYSIS 
SWFs create multiple risk points within the U.S. financial system. 
Their status as a commercial entity prevents them from raising 
jurisdictional bars in the U.S. courts. However, current international 
agreements do not offer an effective means of regulating SWFs. The 
IOSCO MOU and the U.S. Model BIT are ineffective means of 
potential regulation and indeed could hinder effective regulation. 
Additionally, parties to these agreements generally do not control 
SWFs.118 Other international agreements that focus on the 
international financial system more broadly are equally ineffective. 
The structure of the Basel II Accord limits its usefulness, and 
political concerns generally prevent unilateral changes during its 
implementation.119 Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Federal 
Reserve can indirectly regulate SWFs via the Basel II Accord. Finally, 
the IMF Articles of Agreement are ill-equipped to deal with the 
realities of the post World War II financial system.120 
A. The SEC Cannot Effectively Regulate Sovereign Wealth Funds by 
Using the U.S. Model BIT or the IOSCO MOU 
The current form of U.S. BITs (as epitomized by the U.S. 
Model BIT)121 is ill-prepared to deal with the risks posed by SWFs. 
 
 115. See generally id. (giving a history of the international monetary system and placing in 
context the role of the U.S. dollar as the principal reserve asset in the post World War II 
monetary system). 
 116. See generally supra text accompanying note 29. 
 117. See generally IMF Articles, supra note 12 (providing the general obligations of 
members to coordinate on exchange rate policy and to manage their reserve assets in line with 
Articles of Agreement). 
 118. See Appendices A–C (demonstrating very little overlap between the countries that 
have SWFs and the countries that are party to the IOSCO MOU or have a BIT in force with 
the United States). 
 119. See infra Part III.B (highlighting the challenges to making unilateral changes during 
implementation of the Basel II Accord by the United States). 
 120. See infra Part III.C (arguing that the IMF Articles of Agreement are a post World 
War II relic). 
 121. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 7. 
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The focus of BITs is protecting covered investments from 
expropriation by a foreign government,122 giving most-favored-
nation (MFN) treatment to the other contracting party’s investors,123 
guaranteeing repatriation of profits,124 and settling disputes that 
cannot be resolved through consultation and negotiation.125 
Additionally, the U.S. Model BIT provides that foreign investors 
covered under the treaty shall be accorded national treatment in the 
establishment of investments.126 These provisions may actually work 
against a U.S. regulator seeking to pursue legal action or impose 
restrictions on the actions of an SWF, for the reasons described 
below.127 
First, an SWF is defined as an enterprise according to the U.S. 
Model BIT;128 it is treated the same as any other U.S. enterprise, 
meaning that a U.S. regulator may not single out SWFs for any 
specialized regulation without facing a potential investment 
dispute.129 Current U.S. regulation to the analogous hedge fund is a 
hands-off approach.130 The implication of national treatment is that 
U.S. regulators would need to treat SWFs in the same manner as 
hedge funds.131 U.S. regulators may circumvent the national 
treatment of foreign investors because the U.S. Model BIT permits 
 
 122. Id. art. 6. 
 123. Id. art. 4. 
 124. Id. art.7. 
 125. Id. art. 24; see Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: 
Foreign Direct Investment through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 
8–9 (2005) (describing these as the typical key provisions of BITs). 
 126. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 7, art. 3, ¶ 1–3 (stating that the favorable treatment 
accorded to foreign investors needs to be the same as accorded to national investors and that 
those investors can either be juridical or natural persons). 
 127. See Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 125, at 1 (stating that BITs aim to protect 
investors from discriminatory regulation). 
 128. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 7, art. 1 (defining an enterprise as either privately or 
governmentally owned, and organized for profit or not). This wide ranging definition captures 
the activities of SWFs. Id. 
 129. Compare  id. arts. 3–5 (detailing the U.S. obligations as a host party, which include 
providing national treatment and a minimum standard of “fair and equitable treatment”), with 
id. art. 24 (providing for an aggrieved party to submit a claim to arbitration if articles three 
through ten are breached). 
 130. See Hedge Fund Report, supra note 46, at 1–2 (describing the variance of hedge 
fund activity, thus making it difficult to compare SWF activity to hedge fund activity). Note 
that the effectiveness of this approach is limited by the difference in SWF behavior as compared 
to hedge funds because hedge funds tend to aggressively use leverage. Id.; see also supra notes 
46–48 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. approach for hedge fund regulation). 
 131. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 7, art. 3(2) (requiring the same treatment for 
foreign investors that the United States accords to U.S. investors, which includes hedge funds). 
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the prevention of transfers of capital related to investments so long as 
they apply the law in an “equitable, non-discriminatory, and good 
faith” manner.132 The application of certain domestic laws may be 
allowed under the U.S. Model BIT, but that does not prevent an 
SWF from seeking arbitration.133 Finally, the U.S. Model BIT 
provides no impetus for foreign regulators to aid U.S. regulators by 
providing information regarding SWF activities.134 
The IOSCO MOU seems to be the SEC’s best option for 
pursuing an SWF and forcing SWF disclosures, but the MOU lacks 
effectiveness for two reasons: (1) it does not create a legally binding 
obligation,135 and (2) a foreign regulator can deny a request for 
assistance on the grounds of an essential national interest.136 These 
deficiencies are understandable when considered within the context 
of the harmonization versus equivalence debate.137 Harmonization 
requires two countries to have the same rules to achieve the same 
goals whereas equivalence allows for different rules to achieve the 
same goals. Forcing an information exchange may contradict a 
country’s regulatory regime preference.138 The regulatory regime 
 
 132. Id. art. 7, ¶ 4. The U.S. Model BIT allows the United States to prevent the transfer 
of dividends or other investment returns to SWFs that violate “laws relating to: 
  (a) bankruptcy, insolvency, or the protection of the rights of creditors; 
  (b) issuing, trading, or dealing in securities, futures, options, or derivatives; 
  (c) criminal or penal offenses; 
  (d) financial reporting or record keeping of transfers when necessary to assist law 
enforcement or financial regulatory authorities; or 
  (e) ensuring compliance with orders or judgments in judicial or administrative 
proceedings.” 
Id. 
 133. Id. art. 24. 
 134. Id. arts. 18–19 (allowing for the denial of information request due to “essential 
security interests,” or on the less onerous ground that it may “prejudice the legitimate 
commercial interest” of a public enterprise). 
 135. See IOSCO MOU, supra note 8, § 6(a) (stating as a general principle that the MOU 
does not supersede domestic laws). 
 136. See id. § 6(e)(iv) (recognizing the importance of information sharing, but 
eviscerating its effectiveness by allowing countries to evade a request on the basis of public or 
essential national interest). 
 137. See Vinuales, supra 98, at 4 (noting that the two concepts are not mutually exclusive 
as the U.S.-E.U. approach to the harmonization of accounting standards started with 
equivalence). The two are mutually exclusive, however, because equivalence ceases to exist 
when there is regulatory harmonization. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 98. 
 138. See Vinuales, supra note 98, at 56–57 (noting that the Swiss authorities pay lip 
service to information exchanged concerning financial conglomerates, but stringent legal 
hurdles remain before a Swiss authority can relay information to a foreign regulator even when 
an agreement such as the IOSCO MOU is in place). 
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preference is difficult to untangle from a country’s political or 
strategic motives when deciding to share information about an 
SWF’s investment activities.139 Without the legal imperative, it would 
be difficult to elicit a foreign regulator’s support for U.S. regulation 
of that country’s SWF.140 
B. Dashed Hopes for Indirect Regulation by the Federal Reserve 
Through Basel II Implementation 
SWFs invest the excess reserves of their home countries.141 It is 
unlikely that they will participate in the financial system in the same 
manner as sovereign debt borrowers.142 U.S. regulators can 
promulgate regulations forcing financial intermediaries to apply 
pressure to SWFs by requiring banks to take a higher capital charge 
for their interactions with SWFs.143 The typical interaction between 
an SWF and an internationally active bank is likely to be an off-
balance sheet item144 for the bank involving counterparty risk, to 
which the BASEL II Accord does not apply a specific risk 
 
 139. See IOSCO MOU, supra note 8 § 6(e)(iv) (allowing for the rejection of information 
requests based on national security provides an opportunity for rejecting the request based on 
nebulous reasoning). 
 140. See Cox, supra note 4 (questioning the resolve of governments to cooperate with a 
fraud investigation when the target of the fraud is an SWF controlled by the same 
government). Compare Appendix A (listing the major SWFs in existence), with Appendix B 
(listing the signatories to the IOSCO MOU). Note that there is very little overlap between the 
two lists, thus the effectiveness of the IOSCO MOU is limited as a tool to regulate SWFs. Id. 
 141. See supra notes 25–39 and accompanying text (laying out the essential features of 
the SWF). 
 142. Cf. Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International 
Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 711 (2007) (noting that debt instruments are a popular 
means for governments to raise funds). Governments that have the resources to set up an SWF 
would be less likely to interact with internationally active banks with respect to debt issuance as 
the government is not seeking to raise funds, but to invest its excess reserves. Id. 
 143. Compare U.S. Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66–69 (noting the objections of many 
commentators to proposed changes in the Final Rule for implementation of the Basel II 
Accord including claims that the changes would leave U.S. regulated banks at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to foreign regulated banks), with discussion supra notes 102–08 and 
accompanying text (discussing the implementation of Basel II Accord in the United States and 
elsewhere through a soft law approach). The soft law nature of the Basel II Accord allows 
countries to make changes to the rules as they implement them. Id. 
 144. See A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, supra note 30, at 290 (defining an 
off-balance sheet instrument as a derivative transaction that a bank does not have to disclose on 
its balance sheet, which allows banks to hide their exposure to SWF risks). Derivatives are 
financial instruments with their price determined by underlying financial instrument and are 
useful for hedging risk. Id. at 113. 
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weighting.145 
A unilateral move by U.S. banking regulators to require banks 
dealing with SWFs to take a higher capital charge could result in a 
drift from SWFs utilizing U.S. regulated banks, resulting in less 
income for those banks.146 Thus, unilaterally imposing a higher 
capital charge leaves U.S. regulated banks at a competitive 
disadvantage to non-U.S. regulated banks.147 Furthermore, the 
higher capital charge does not necessarily prevent SWFs from dealing 
with a non-U.S. regulated subsidiary of a U.S. regulated bank.148 
From a legal standpoint, U.S. banking regulators are free to change 
the requirements of the Basel 
II Accord because its provisions are non-binding.149 From a 
practical standpoint, with the institutional momentum of the Basel II 
Accords, it is not a viable option for U.S. regulators to make 
substantive changes during the implementation of the Basel 
Accords.150 
 
 145. See Basel II Accord, supra note 100, at 22 (“Counterparty risk weightings for OTC 
derivative transactions will not be subject to any specific ceiling.”). There are provisions for 
dealing with short-term commitments such as letters of credit collateralized by the underlying 
shipment, repo-style transactions with other banks, etc. Id. The Basel II Accord, however, 
deferred a decision on how to handle counterparty credit risk with respect to unsettled 
securities and foreign exchange transactions, and left it to the banks to decide how to mitigate 
their credit exposure in this area. Id. 
 146. See U.S. Final Rule, supra note 12, at 41–42 (stating that foreign subsidiaries of 
U.S. banks can avail themselves of  “host jurisdiction definition[s] of default for retail 
exposures of the foreign subsidiary in that jurisdiction . . . “); see also Joel P. Trachtman, 
Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction in International Securities Regulation, in 
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 290–91 (Daniel C. Esty & 
Damien Geradin, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (arguing that allowing foreign subsidiaries to 
choose host jurisdiction regulation would create a situation “imposing no substantive 
obligations” on issuers because they would move to seemingly regulation-free states). 
 147. See U.S. Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66–69 (noting the concerns of commentators 
reacting to the proposal to change aspects of the U.S. Final Rule away from the requirements 
set forth in the Basel II Accord, and indicating that it would leave U.S. regulated banks at a 
competitive disadvantage when compared to non-U.S. regulated banks). 
 148. Cf. id. at 41–42 (differentiating between the approach for the wholesale transaction 
category, which cover SWFs, and retail transactions where the U.S. banking regulators 
explicitly note that foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-regulated financial institutions may follow their 
home country’s rules for allocating risk assessments to counterparties). 
 149. See Lawrence C. Lee, Integration of International Banking Supervisory Standards: A 
Blueprint for the Taiwanese Banking System, 19 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 455, 460 (2000) 
(commenting that the purpose of the Basel Accords is not to create legally binding agreements 
and that in order for the agreements to be effective, they are dependent upon national-level 
implementation and enforcement). 
 150. Id. at 460–61 (suggesting that the Basel Accords should apply to all financial 
intermediaries). It is arguable that because of the interconnectedness of the financial system the 
Basel Accords do apply to most if not all of the financial institutions in some respect. Id. 
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C. The IMF Articles of Agreement -- A False Panacea 
There is a tension between applying the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity and utilizing the IMF Articles of Agreement to 
regulate SWFs. The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity treats 
the government entity as a commercial actor, while the non-self-
execution doctrine implies that actors under the IMF Articles of 
Agreement are sovereign entities.151 Distinguishing between a 
sovereign’s actions and a sovereign’s independently created agency is 
difficult, especially in the case of SWFs.152 SWFs invest a country’s 
excess reserves153 but claim to seek a profit.154 This mixture of 
resources and motives leads to their muddled status with respect to 
the IMF Articles of Agreement. FSIA defines SWFs as commercial 
actors stripped of their sovereign status, yet the IMF Articles of 
Agreement cover sovereign actions, which seemingly makes these 
two views irreconcilable.155 
IMF members are obligated to collaborate on policies 
concerning reserve assets as seen in Article VIII, section seven.156 
This would seemingly require members to collaborate on matters 
concerning SWFs, but the thrust of the Articles of Agreement is to 
promote international liquidity by making the Special Drawing Right 
(SDR) the principal reserve asset, which the IMF framers assumed 
would replace the U.S. dollar’s position in the world today.157 Article 
8, section seven seeks to prevent the use of capital controls that harm 
 
 151. Compare Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992) (holding that the 
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity results in the classification of some government 
entities as commercial actors), with Em Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., 473 F.3d 463, 482–83 (2d Cir. 
2007) (holding that the powers under the IMF Articles of Agreement, i.e., reserves 
management, are sovereign in nature). 
 152. Cf. Paul L. Lee, Central Banks and Sovereign Immunity, 41 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 327, 364 (noting that a series of appellate cases demonstrated an “aversion to 
overriding the presumption of independent status for separate corporate agencies or 
instrumentalities.”). 
 153. See Em Ltd., 473 F.3d at 482–83 (holding that managing reserves is sovereign in 
nature). 
 154. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text (explaining the fiduciary duty of 
SWFs and the need to maximize the r/r equation). 
 155. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (piercing the sovereign veil for the commercial activities 
of foreign states). 
 156. See IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. VIII, § 7 (including the word “and” in 
between the provision for collaborating with respect to reserve asset management and the 
promotion of the SDR as the principal reserve asset provision, thus creating a dual obligation). 
 157. Id.; see generally EICHENGREEN, supra note 99 (arguing the momentum of the U.S. 
dollar prevented the SDR from assuming the U.S. dollar’s place in the international monetary 
system). 
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international liquidity regardless of the general obligation found in 
this section to collaborate regarding exchange rate policy.158 
Additionally, the goal of making the SDR the principal reserve asset 
makes it clear that Article VIII, section seven intends to promote 
collaboration with respect to some reserve asset policies but not at 
the expense of harming international liquidity.159 
Reporting measures defined by Article VIII, section five are 
inadequate because they only require a broad view of a country’s 
investment activities. Section five governs the furnishing of 
information because not all countries have accepted the use of the 
SDR as a principal reserve asset.160 Subsection VII requires disclosure 
of a country’s international investment position, but this is a 
macroeconomic measure and does not provide specifics about a 
country’s individual investment decisions.161 Other provisions of 
section five require members to provide similar macroeconomic 
data.162 Most members of the IMF currently furnish such data but 
are not required to furnish information about the investments made 
by SWFs.163 Nominally, the IMF Articles of Agreement offer false 
hope as a means to regulate SWFs by mandating disclosures. The 
IMF Articles of Agreement did not contemplate a post World War II 
financial system where countries not only hold reserve assets but 
utilize them for investment purposes. 
 
 158. See IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. VIII, § 7 (stating that the aim of the mutual 
collaboration is to promote international liquidity and not specifically to monitor member’s 
reserve asset management). 
 159. See id. (demonstrating that liquidity is the primary goal, which is understandable in a 
post World War II era where concern focused on capital and current account controls, and not 
investment by states). 
 160. Id. art. VIII, § 5 (requiring member countries to provide information concerning 
gold and foreign exchange holdings, which would be unnecessary if countries only held SDRs 
as reserve assets). 
 161. Id. art. VIII, § 5(vii); see APPLEYARD ET AL., supra note 6, at 459–63 (giving an 
overview of the international investment position of countries and stating that it is a 
macroeconomic indicator that does not provide specific information on micro-level 
management of reserves). 
 162. See generally IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. VIII, § 5 (describing the various 
responsibilities of member governments under the treaty, and conspicuously absent is any 
provision where a member would need to provide specific data concerning its investment 
position). 
 163. See IMF, The Data: Coverage, Periodicity, and Timeliness, http://dsbb.imf.org/ 
Applications/web/sddsdatadimensions/ (last visited Sep. 29, 2008)(providing the categories 
of statistics that governments provide under the Special Data Dissemination Standard, which 
does not require countries to provide the type of data necessary to reduce transparency 
concerns about SWFs). 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the current structure is flawed, the best approach to 
regulating SWFs is through adjustments to the existing framework. 
The international agreements outlined above offer little help to U.S. 
regulators concerned with SWF activity affecting the United States. 
Either the agreements do not include the necessary participants to 
make them useful, or they lack the provisions to make them 
effective.164 Even those agreements that are non-binding prevent the 
United States from unilaterally making changes to them.165 Making 
changes to the existing framework is more time-effective whereas 
negotiating a multilateral investment framework would be very time-
intensive. This Comment offers recommendations for changes to the 
U.S. Model BIT, including modification to disclosure requirements, 
and to the Basel Capital Adequacy Standards and the IMF Articles of 
Agreement. 
A. Recommendations for the U.S. Model BIT 
The U.S. Model BIT offers the United States the best hope for 
regulating SWFs. Currently, its provisions block attempts to single 
out an SWF for regulation separate from that which governs a 
domestic entity. Utilizing the U.S. Model BIT remains a 
hypothetical approach to SWF regulation because there are no 
countries with SWFs that have agreed to a U.S. BIT.166 This 
approach would require negotiation of a treaty and would allow the 
other party to request concessions from the U.S. government. 
1. Include information sharing provisions similar in scope to the 
IOSCO MOU 
Including a package of provisions similar to the IOSCO MOU in 
the U.S. Model BIT could allow the United States to bind other 
countries to provide information on SWFs when requested by U.S. 
regulators.167 The scope of the requirement to provide information 
 
 164. Compare Appendix A (listing the countries that control SWFs), with Appendix B 
(providing scant overlap with Appendix A), and Appendix C (presenting the ineffectiveness of 
the BIT as a tool for SWF). 
 165. See supra notes and accompanying text 146–150 (elucidating the challenges of 
unilaterally changing the Basel II Accord during U.S. implementation). 
 166. See Appendix C (demonstrating the need to negotiate with other countries because 
the current U.S. BITs are with countries that do not have SWFs). 
 167. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text (determining the effectiveness of the 
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would need to include a detailed accounting of foreign investments 
in the United States. This requirement would need to be binding, 
which is the major drawback with respect to the IOSCO MOU.168 
2. Single out government investment vehicles 
Currently, the MFN and national treatment of countries allow 
for government entities that engage in commercial activities to 
receive the same treatment as a publicly held company.169 The 
United States should recognize that SWFs pose greater risks than the 
average foreign investor does and should single out SWFs in the U.S. 
Model BIT.170 Information requests about SWFs should not be 
denied because of national security. They are operating in a 
commercial sphere and should be treated accordingly.171 The USTR 
should probably be prepared to accept some level of hedge fund 
regulation as a compromise to their demands for the U.S. Model 
BIT to single out SWFs. By doing so, the USTR could maintain the 
overall goal of BITs to provide equal protection of foreign and 
domestic investors. 
B. Modification of the Basel Capital Adequacy Standards 
The next revision to the Basel Capital Adequacy Standards 
should include provisions that recognize SWFs as a separate entity 
from the central bank and accord them different treatment. 
Currently banks can elect to treat SWFs as having the same 
creditworthiness172 as the central bank.173 Allowing banks to elect 
 
IOSCO MOU with respect to the regulation of SWFs). But see IOSCO MOU, supra note 8, at 
§ 6(a) (showing the MOU could only serve as a starting point because its language is intended 
to be non-binding and allow for a country to deny an information request based on national 
interest). Allowing a country to deny an information request in a revised BIT context would 
undermine its effectiveness and render it as useless in the context of regulating SWFs as the 
IOSCO MOU. See id.  
 168. See IOSCO MOU, supra note 8, § 6(a) (stating that the MOU is non-binding). 
 169. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 7, arts. 3–4 (requiring similar treatment between 
foreign and domestic investors). 
 170. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (detailing the comparative size of SWFs). 
 171. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (removing sovereign immunity for commercial activities by 
sovereign actors). 
 172. See A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, supra note 30, at 100 (defining 
creditworthiness as a measure of an entity’s ability to repay debt, which in the case of SWFs 
should be relatively high considering they are flush with cash and other highly liquid 
instruments). 
 173. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text (showing the discretion given to 
banks concerning SWFs). 
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how they treat SWFs with respect to the capital charge removes any 
leverage that a regulator could potentially apply to financial 
intermediaries in hopes of garnering disclosures about SWFs’ 
investment decisions. The United States cannot unilaterally change 
the regulations for the banks it manages because an SWF could 
simply utilize a foreign subsidiary of the same bank over which the 
United States does not have control.174 As such, capital adequacy 
standards should be modified for financial intermediaries dealing 
with SWFs that do not adhere to a specified level of transparency. 
C. Specific Changes for the IMF Articles of Agreement and a Plan for 
Their Implementation 
In addition to the IMF developing a set of best practices for 
SWFs,175 making simple changes to the IMF Articles of Agreement 
could make it easier to obtain information about SWFs. First, adding 
“individual investment positions”176 as a category of reporting to 
Article VIII, § 5(a)(i) would make this provision useful for those 
seeking more transparency from SWFs.177 Second, adding “with the 
exception of government sponsored investment vehicles”178 to the 
second line of Article VIII, § 5(b) would add the obligation that 
members report data with sufficiency to cover SWFs.179 
The United States and Western Europe could entice other IMF 
members to accept the changes in exchange for enhanced voting 
 
 174. See discussion supra Part III.B (analyzing the issues concerning unilateral changes to 
the Basel II Accord by the United States). 
 175. See Truman, supra note 33, at 9 (stating that the IMF or World Bank could wait for 
governments to enlist their assistance, or they could take the initiative and establish a code of 
best practices); see also Clay Lowery, Acting Under Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. 
Treasury, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s Conference on the Asian 
Financial Crisis Revisited: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the International Financial System 
(June 21, 2007), available at http://www.frbsf.org/banking/asiasource/events/2007/ 
0706/papers/lowery.pdf (calling for the IMF and World Bank to lead with a set of best 
practices, but also stating that there is a need to review foreign direct investment to protect 
national security without creating undue barriers). 
 176. The revised provision would read as follows: “i) Official holdings at home and 
abroad of (1) gold, (2) foreign exchange, and (3) individual investment positions.” 
 177. IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. VIII, § 5; see Truman, supra note 33, at 8 
(discussing the IMF’s special data dissemination standard (SDDS), which provides for a greater 
detail of reserve composition reporting). Many countries go beyond the minimum standards of 
SDDS and report their reserve management strategies as part of their SDDS reports. Id. 
 178. The revised provision would read as follows: “b) Members shall be under no 
obligation to furnish information in such detail that the affairs of individuals or corporations 
are disclosed with the exception of government sponsored investment vehicles.” 
 179. IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. VIII, § 5. 
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rights.180 Currently, control of the IMF is concentrated in those 
Western powers.181 However, the countries controlling the IMF 
generally do not have SWFs. In contrast, countries with a 
disproportionately small share of voting rights control many SWFs. 
By exchanging SWF disclosure for enhanced voting rights, the IMF 
can become more democratic and create a relevant role for itself in 
the 21st century.182 
V. CONCLUSION 
The SEC and other U.S. regulators lack the tools to effectively 
regulate SWFs. Since SWFs are treated as investors, they enjoy many 
of the benefits granted to others in their class. Most of the SEC’s 
tools are framed around protecting investors rather than regulating 
them. The disclosure regime of the SEC is focused on issuers and 
certain insiders. Thus far, SWFs have not fallen into either of these 
categories because they have elected not to appoint directors, have 
remained under the 10% threshold of ownership after which an 
investor must file a disclosure with the SEC as a beneficial owner, 
and have not become issuers. 
As demonstrated, the international agreements to which the 
United States is a party, offer little relief from the shortcomings of 
the domestic system. They provide no additional means of forcing 
disclosure from SWFs. Additionally, the pursuit of securities law 
violators in an international context necessarily predicates the 
cooperation of foreign regulators, though this may be easier said 
than done when the arm’s length distance between the regulator and 
the regulated breaks down. Understanding the legal context of 
regulating SWFs supports the conclusion that the discussion 
surrounding regulation has less to do with the law and more to do 
with politics. 
 
 180. Cf. APPLEYARD ET AL., supra note 6, at 749 (calling for greater transparency of IMF 
decision making). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
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APPENDIX A:  
COUNTRIES WITH SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS183 
Australia 
Brunei 
Canada (Alberta) 
China 
Kuwait 
Libya 
Micronesia 
Norway 
Qatar 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
Singapore 
South Korea 
United Arab Emirates 
United States (Alaska) 
 
 183. Compiled from: HANNESSON, supra note 35; Hildebrand, supra note 27; The 
World’s Most Expensive Club, supra note 15. 
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APPENDIX B: 
IOSCO MOU SIGNATORIES184 
Alberta Securities Commission (SC), Alberta  
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), Australia  
Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB), Bahrain, Kingdom of  
Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission, Belgium 
Bermuda Monetary Authority, Bermuda  
British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC), British Columbia  
Financial Services Commission of the British Virgin Islands, British 
Virgin Islands  
China Securities Regulatory Commission, China  
Czech National Bank, Czech Republic  
Denmark Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanstilsynet), Denmark  
Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA), Dubai  
Financial Supervision Authority, Finland  
Autorité des marchés financiers, France  
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungaufsicht (BAFin), Germany  
Capital Market Commission (CMC), Greece  
Securities and Futures Commission, Hong Kong  
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, Hungary  
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), India 
Financial Supervision Commission, Isle of Man  
Israel Securities Authority (ISA), Israel  
Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa, Italy  
Financial Services Agency (FSA), Japan  
Jersey Financial Services Commission (FSC), Jersey  
Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), Jordan  
Lithuanian Securities Commission, Lithuania 
Commission de surveillance du secteur financier of Luxembourg, 
Luxembourg  
Securities Commission of Malaysia, Malaysia  
Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA), Malta  
Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV), Mexico  
Conseil déontologique des valeurs mobilières (CDVM), Morocco  
The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM), 
Netherlands, The  
 
 184. Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns [IOSCO] Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (May 2002) app. 
A, available at http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_siglist. 
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Securities Commission of New Zealand (SC), New Zealand  
Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria (NSEC), Nigeria  
The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (Kredittilsynet), 
Norway  
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), Ontario  
Polish Securities and Exchange Commission (PSEC), Poland  
Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM), Portugal  
Autorité des Marchés Financiers, Québec  
Monetary Authority of Singapore, Singapore  
The National Bank of Slovakia, Slovak Republic  
Financial Services Board (FSB), South Africa  
Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV), Spain  
Securities and Exchange Commission, Sri Lanka  
Capital Markets Board (CMB), Turkey  
Financial Services Authority (FSA), United Kingdom  
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), United States  
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), United States 
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APPENDIX C: 
COUNTRIES WITH BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES WITH THE 
UNITED STATES185 
 
 185. Trade Compliance Center, Bilateral Investment Treaties Currently in Force as of 
Feb. 2, 2009, http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral_Investment_Treaties/ 
index.asp. 
Albania 
Argentina 
Armenia                                                   
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Bolivia 
Bulgaria 
Cameroon 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 
(Kinshasa) 
Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville) 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt       
Estonia 
Georgia 
Grenada 
Honduras 
 
 Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Panama 
Romania 
Senegal 
Slovakia 
Sri Lanka 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey   
Ukraine 
Uruguay                                                                       
 
